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Abstract
The paper challenges the view that the major theoretical and methodological issues in the 
social sciences have been resolved and that  positivism provides the only sound basis for 
research in construction.   By examining the relationship between specialist discourses and 
natural language and Weber's failure to provide a basis for objective causal explanations of 
social action,  it  is argued that  the kind of theorising that  Runeson advocates  is at  best 
premature  and  at  worst  preempts  the  achievement  of  a  more  rigorous  and  thorough 
understanding of construction processes.   Reporting some empirical research on the design 
and construction of reinforced concrete structures,  the paper seeks to  demonstrate  some 
theoretical methodological and practical implications of  an interpretive style of research.
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Introduction
We thank the editors of this journal for the invitation to reply to Runeson's paper (1998). In 
this reply we will try to show  to readers, variously concerned in the construction industry, 
the practical relevance of what may understandably appear to  some as non-consequential, 
theoretical logic-chopping. We will do this by focussing on a particular item from our own 
empirical research since we think this is a better way of answering Runeson's criticisms of 
the concerns we have expressed in a number of articles (e.g.  Seymour and Rook 1995, 
Seymour et al 1997, Rooke 1997). Our attempt will be to allay any suspicion that we are 
concerned only with methodological niceties. However, we do take leave to  consider the 
criticisms 'head-on'   because  it  will enable  us  to  make  some general  points  about  the 
difficulties entailed in drawing on  specialist  academic disciplines to  meet  the  ultimately 
practical aims of construction management studies.
We wish to  make the  following points  about  the  arguments  which go  on  in the  social 
sciences each of which will be taken up in turn. 
First,  and on this we differ most  profoundly from Runeson, the arguments in the social 
sciences about principle and method are unresolved and are likely to remain so. 
Second, the arguments are necessary and, if conducted in the spirit of scholarship and the 
desire for greater understanding, are valuable and conducive to good research. 
Third, while we have an absolute obligation to make ourselves understood to our readers, 
this is often not easy since they come with different degrees of interest in and familiarity with 
the different concerns of the various disciplines.
Fourth, and this point follows directly from the third, while there are specialist discourses 
developed to express specialist interest and concerns, they are all rooted in and depend on 
the language of everday life. Failure to  recognise the different logics inherent in different 
discourses leads to confusion. We will examine such a confusion which arises from Weber's 
project for a social science. 
Finally, we will illustrate  the relationship between specialist and every day discourses by 
examining some research on the problem of achieving adequate cover for reinforcement in 
concrete structures.
The unresolved issues and the necessity of argument 
Runeson seems to evince  confidence that all the important theoretical and methodological 
issues in the social sciences have been resolved and that positivist social science has achieved 
a level of development such that it is ready and waiting to provide the conceptual apparatus 
with which to solve the problems of the construction industry. We are less sanguine about 
this promise and have sought to explain why. 
Nonetheless, he agrees with our  main point that  scientific method (as understood  in the 
physical sciences) has its limitations, when it comes to researching human activities.  We are 
in agreement too regarding the overuse of statistics in construction management research. 
He  also  agrees  that  research  may have  different  kinds  of  topic  and  different  purposes 
susceptible to different kinds of treatment. Yet, despite this,  he seems to ignore the issue we 
are trying to raise: given the inappropriateness of the methods so often used, the variety of 
topics that construction management research addresses and the purposes it may have, how 
are scientific and non-scientific purposes to be identified and what principles are there for 
guidance on how research should proceed? In short,  while we have tried to  state  some 
problems with  current  research  and  have  proposed  ways  of  addressing them,  Runeson 
condemns our suggestions but offers none of his own. 
However,  we  welcome  his  brief  review  of  Weber's  concept  of  verstehen as  a  useful 
contribution to the debate and we consider the importance and difficulties associated with 
verstehen below. He also correctly identifies a problem of definitions, such that terms remain 
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vaguely defined or subtly change their meanings as the debate progresses.  But he does not 
recognise  that  this  is  an  inevitable  feature  of  such  debates  which  progress  largely by 
acheiving successively clearer definitions of the terms in use.   He seems unaware that the 
problem exists with regard to  his own use of terms.   Thus, for instance, it is not always 
clear whether he rejects or accepts the positivist view of science, which he seems sometimes 
to defend  and at others to regard as superseded by later thinkers (Runeson 1997, Runeson 
1998).   
He usefully raises the moral issue involved with the injunction of "accepting other people's 
'reality'  (sic)  without  question".    It  must  be clearly understood  that  this  consists  in a 
recommendation for research practice and not  in a philosophy of life.   There is all the 
difference in the world between dispassionately examining a set  of beliefs and conceding 
their moral validity,   not that the former task is easy.
The need for constructive argument
This observation takes us to the second point: argument is necessary and valuable so long as 
it is directed at mutual enlightenement. Unfortunately, Runeson obscures and devalues his 
contribution by his aggressive debating style.   Perhaps the worst feature of this is the way 
he attributes views to us which we have not expressed, but which make easy targets for his 
own 'refutations'.  
Thus, we are held to  believe that  a $5 hamburger can be cheaper than a $2 hamburger! 
Though this is impossible  what Runeson's talent for parody obscures is that a $5 hamburger 
may be more desirable than a $2 hamburger.   There might be all sorts of reasons for this, 
but one possible reason is that the $5 hamburger is more expensive, and therefore 'must be 
better',  another  is that  the hamburger,  though no better,  is 'more exclusive' -  simply by 
paying more than we need to for an item, we can demonstrate our ability to do so.   It is 
such views as these, which Runeson may wish to dismiss as illogical, that account for real 
people, in the real world performing real actions - witness, for example, the popularity of 
designer clothes.   It is the explication of such views  (and not a set of hypothetical causal 
regularities which Runeson claims that science has discovered but which he does not specify) 
which allow us to predict human behaviour.
Though the  general thrust  of Runeson's paper  is to  convey the  impression that  we are 
ignorantes, it is difficult to  see, in that  case, why he bothers to  reply to  us at all.   Is it 
because  he  believes  the  rest  of  the  Construction  Management  community  are  also 
ignorantes and therefore likely to  be misled by us? This certainly seems to  be implied in 
some of the comments he makes.   Thus, it seems, we are guilty of hiding our true intentions 
"among logical somersaults and emotive language".   This is an entirely unsupported charge 
Runeson’s  own use of emotive words and phrases seems designed to hide the fact that his 
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assertions are unsupported by argument or evidence.   An example of this is his use of a 
review of Studies in Ethnomethodology.   This review may well contain reasoned arguments, 
if so, Runeson  neglects to tell us what they are. 
Another inadequacy in his paper is the attack on Garfinkel. Runeson asserts that Garfinkel 
has retreated  from his earlier position.  This is not  the case.  We take it that  Runeson is 
referring to  the opening passage of the paper to  which he refers (Garfinkel 1996) where 
Garfinkel attempts to situate EM in relation to mainstream social science (ibid p6). Referring 
to the latter's achievements , he writes: "EM does not dispute those achievements." (loc cit). 
Indeed, Garfinkel has never sought to dispute these achievements. For instance, in what is 
regarded  as  EM's  foundational  text,  Studies  in  Ethnomethodology,  he  writes: 
"Ethnomethodological studies are  not  directed at  formulating or  arguing correctives [...] 
They do  not  formulate  a  remedy for  practical actions,  as if it  were  being found about 
practical action that  they were better  or  worse than they are usually cracked up to  be." 
(Garfinkel 1967/84 p viii). Rather, EM treats these achievements of social science like any 
other practical achievement as topics for EM analysis in their own right.
For some reason, probably the difficulty of his writing occasioned by his putting precision 
before  ease  of  understanding (a  problem which all of  us  need  to  struggle  to  resolve), 
Garfinkel  attracts  dismissive  comments.  Runeson  mistakes  Garfinkel's  courteous 
acknowledgement  of  the  social  science movements  'undoubted  achievements'  (Garfinkel 
1996) as a retraction and no one should  read Studies in Ethnomethodology in such a way. 
Garfinkel has always been highly complimentary about  the achievements of conventional 
social science, particularly the work of  Talcott  Parsons, which "remains awsome for the 
penetrating depth and unfailing precision of its practical sociological reasoning". (Garfinkel 
1967/84 p ix).    
We are also puzzled by Runeson's remarks on Rooke (1997), a paper which seems to have 
relatively straightforward implications To set  these out  formally, the paper proposes two 
premises and a deduction:
1.   for statistical data to be valid, definitions must be consistent over the study (every time 
we count a duck, we must be sure it is a duck and not a crow)
2.   in the transcript of questionnaire interview reproduced, the definition of 'manager' did 
not remain consistent (a manager may be a supervisor, or a professional)
If these two  premises are  accepted  (and we cannot  see on what  grounds they could be 
refuted), then the deduction is inevitable - the statistical datum generated by the interview is 
not valid.   It is true that this does not prove that all statistical data are invalid, but it does 
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demonstrate that the validity of any particular piece of statistical data is open to question. 
The practical consequence of this is that any piece of statistical evidence which contradicts 
our own common sense beliefs can be readily dismissed.
Natural Language and Specialist Discourse
The purpose of our papers (Seymour and Rooke 1995, Seymour et al 1997) was to draw 
attention to  the fact  that  members of the construction management research community 
were drawing on and uncritically applying concepts and methods about  which there was 
much disagreement within the disciplines whence they came. In particular, it was our view 
that there were whole traditions of social enquiry which are ignored or slighted because they 
do not conform to a naive view of science. It  was our aim to  defend and promote these 
traditions especially those which take very seriously the problems of achieving a genuinely 
scientific status.
It was precisely our effort to encourage this debate and to query the superficial 'scientific' 
criteria that were being applied to guarantee quality in research that led to our being accused 
of being anti-scientific. We accept a large part of the responsibility for this misunderstanding 
having perhaps been guilty of  misleading by oversimplification. However, we stress that this 
problem  is  endemic  and  exposes  the  complicated  relationship  between  every  natural 
language and the demands placed upon language in the pursuit of precision and accuracy. 
Thus, as we embark again on an effort to clarify the contribution that we believe sociology 
(rather  than  various  trivializations  of  it)  can  make  to  construction  management,  we 
emphasise the need for clarity and precision, recognising at  the same time the difficulties 
created in effectively communicating what needs to be said if it is to be found accessible and 
useful. 
We note that our difficulty here is to communicate to non-specialists the results to date of an 
on-going and often complex process in which scholars refine their thinking in the course of 
critical discussion.   It  is through this process that  a better  understanding of the world is 
achieved. However, such a debate also results in the creation of specialist discourses which 
are not readily accessible to outsiders. At the same time, these discourses are  rooted in and 
cannot  escape from the natural language of everyday life.  We will now consider some 
implications of this important fact.
Natural Language as the Basic Matrix for specialist Discourse
We all live in the common sense everyday world and make sense to  each other  in the 
language available to us - the natural language of everyday speech. Even the most refined 
and specialised languages,  say that  used in physics,  has its roots  in and continually has 
recourse  to  natural  language.  For  example,  there  is currently a  problem with achieving 
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adequate concrete cover to  the rebar in reinforced concrete (RC) structures. This is very 
important for without adequate cover, salts and water get to the rebar, they rust, expand, the 
concrete cracks, falls away, exposing the the rebar to futher deterioration and ultimately an 
unserviceable building. Why does it happen and how can it be prevented? Is it a matter of 
poor workmanship? Poor design? Poor communication? Poor supervision?
Any normally competent  person  can  understand  this  problem though  as  a  matter  for 
specialist study the issue is construed in a variety of specialist ways - by industrial chemists, 
materials scientists, engineers and so on. Thus, in terms of the substantive themes that are 
brought under examination and the kinds of factors that are held relevant to understanding 
them, there is a basis in ordinary language for communicating this understanding as between 
laypersons and specialists. 'It  is in this agreement - agreement as to  the fundamental and 
ordered existence of the phenomenon independent of its having been addressed by  some 
method of enquiry - that  [specialist] and lay[person] are mutually oriented to  a common 
factual domain.' (Zimmerman and Pollner 1971 p81)
Scientific ways of thinking are well established and efficacious for predicting the behaviour 
of  concrete  in  specified  conditions  (see  for  example  DOE,  1997).  At  various  times, 
experiments are conducted and observations recorded; generalisations are achieved through 
inductive reasoning or sudden insight; hypotheses are derived and tested. Experiments are 
designed to  be  reproducible and results  published in a  language  understandable to  any 
member  of  the  specialist  scientific  community  concerned.  However,  these  methods  of 
enquiry, intended to  produce empirical generalization, are not so effective in studying the 
organizational contexts in which concrete structures are erected 
Of course, in a common sense sort of way, for anyone associated with the process of RC 
construction, there are general patterns,  series of events that  tend to  happen in  broadly 
predictable ways. Our lives would be quite literally senseless if we were not able to count on 
such regularities and patterns.  But  there  is a  world of difference between the  everyday 
accomplishment of recognising patterns of conduct and the scientific enterprise of generating 
rigorous law-like generalisations from which can be derived precise and definite predictions, 
given stated conditions. The research discussed below and reported more fully elsewhere 
(Seymour et al 1997, Shammas-Toma et al 1997) concluded that failure to take account of 
this difference undermines the whole specification procedure used in the UK construction 
industry with respect to RC. This procedure is based on the assumption that it ought to be 
possible to determine these patterns of conduct with scientific accuracy. 
For example, the assumption in design practice when specifying the required cover is that 
there are consistent patterns in the distribution of cover achieved. Based on this assumption 
cover surveys have been conducted and their findings used to establish values and tolerances 
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that  need to  be complied with on site (Clear 1990). Specifications are therefore stated in 
terms of nominal cover (the target) plus or minus what is deemed to be acceptable by the 
designer in following the Standards. 
However, it is recognised that there will be some variation in site conditions and that the 
construction of in-situ concrete is a highly interactive process. An attempt is therefore made 
to address some features of this issue in BS 5606 (Seymour et al 1996).  In recognition of 
the  distinctive  features  of  the  construction  process,  whilst  preserving  the  logic  of 
specification through the use of tolerances, it states that tolerances should be specified which 
reflect the following:
1 the dimensional tolerance needs of the design;
2   the  particular  requirements  of  the  various  elements  and  components  of  the 
construction.
According to these criteria, the tolerances for concrete cover are to be determined from the 
assessment of combined deviation limits. In other words, the criteria are intended to  take 
into account the deviations that occur at the various stages in the construction of an element, 
say a wall or a column.  Deviations may occur as follows:
1.   The accuracy of setting out and positioning the kicker. This is specified on some sites as 
'the position of structural elements shall be accurate to ± 3mm'.
2.   The accuracy of the thickness of the structural element is stated in many specifications to 
be within ± 4mm.
3.   The plumbness of the structural elements is stated to be within ± 6mm per storey.
4.   The bending of reinforcement is recommended to be ± 5mm for closed dimensions.
However, in the view of some practitioners this does not go far enough. For example, it is 
held that there is incompatibility of the cover tolerances with other construction tolerances 
of the structural element. Thus;
"Over-tightening of bolts of the forms that is within tolerance but thinner 
than the specified thickness of the wall. We can over-tighten the bolts by 
5mm or something like that and this reduces the cover."
"We have tolerances on the kicker.  We set out the kicker separately from 
the starter bars. We sometimes end up cranking bars to get the cover on 
the kicker."
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(Seymour et al 1996, p 13)
BS5606 provides an equation to calculate the combined tolerance of the total deviation of a 
specific design or interface; 
DL DL DL DLt n= + + +( ) ( ) ..... ( )1
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Total deviation limits
Component deviation limits
Using this equation to calculate the cover tolerance,  the tolerance that needs to be applied 
is ± 10mm for vertical structural elements.   However, this does not take into account the 
movement  of  the  shutters  or  reinforcement  during  placement  and  compaction  of  the 
concrete.  Further,  the  tolerance will change depending on the changes of the  individual 
tolerances  of  the  component  features  introduced  in  particular  contract  specifications. 
Theoretically,  then,  the  construction  process  should  comply with  a  cover  tolerance  of 
± 10mm for vertical structural elements, assuming that it is physically possible for the design 
to be erected within the tolerances specified.
What is offered in this formula, then, is derived from an ideal-typification (cf Weber); a 
simplification intended to act as a model or guideline based upon inductive generalization. It 
may well act as a rough and ready guide but, as was pointed out in the quotes above,  it is 
very  rough and ready indeed and has to  be supplemented with knowledge of situationally 
specific conditions.
These observations on the nature and use of typifications become ever more significant the 
more  complex  the  processes  they aim to  represent  become  and  yet  similar  theoretical 
formulations  using  abstract  concepts,  sometimes  in  the  symbolic  terms  as  used  in  the 
equation above, are employed to express them. Indeed, the research referred to above has 
been criticised for not expressing our findings in such terms. We have, for example, been 
asked what correlations there are between cover achieved and such contextual features as 
size of  firm involved,  contractual  form used  and so  on.  While we  have supplied such 
information (Shammas-Toma 1998),  we have stressed that  any inferences based on them 
must be highly speculative. Of much greater significance, in our view is, to understand the 
actual processes involved in particular cases, the point we will discuss in the final section of 
this paper. 
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The problem identified here points to  the limitations of applying to  a social process (the 
design and construction  of  RC)  a  logic which is appropriate  to  understanding physical 
phenomena where the impact of different variables can be manipulated in controlled ways. 
Consider what is being attempted in applying such a logic to  understanding/explaining a 
social process. As researchers, our understanding of particular phenomena (eg designing and 
constructing a concrete element) is made possible by a mass of common sense recognitions 
and capabilities which we share with people whose conduct is of interest to us (designers, 
site  managers,  formwork  carpenters,  steel  fixers,  concretors  etc).  As  observers  of  RC 
construction practice we make any number of common sense assumptions about what those 
in the process are doing, why they are doing it and so on. In providing descriptions and 
analyses of this process we convert all the understanding that we have gained through our 
use of common sense, shared knowledge into formalised concepts. These abstractions act as 
a kind of short hand or code which needs to be decoded by those to whom we convey our 
understanding. They, in turn, do so by drawing on the very same kinds of understanding that 
we have used in providing the abstracted account. Thus, the formula referred to above is a 
shorthand which conveys in an encoded form information which is to  be interpreted (or 
decoded).  The  comments  reported  above  were  that  the  formula  did  not  cover  the 
eventualities  likely to  be  encountered  and  so  forth.  This  is inevitable.  As Wittgenstein 
pointed  out,  though we have rules to  guide us  in our  activities,  these  must  always be 
interpreted. And though we may make rules to guide our interpretations, these rules must 
also  be  interpreted.  A  major  concern  in  our  own  research  is  with  the  methods  of 
interpretation.
What can we expect from a social science?
Here then is the major problem that a social science faces in trying to provide an objective, 
factual account  of the structure  and dynamics of social processes (say,  constructing RC 
buildings). There is, of course, an understandable desire amongst practitioners for accurate 
and factual accounts of the way things are; for analysis which cuts through of the incidentals 
of things to reveal the essentials, the underlying causal patterns as the basis for re-synthesis 
and more reliable guides to action. This is understandable because the natural sciences have 
achieved  and  continue  to  achieve  such  accounts  and  many within  the  social  sciences 
(including Runeson) promise that their own principles and methods of enquiry will deliver 
such accounts. 
We have argued throughout that insofar as people do find such offerings useful, well and 
good. However, what we have criticised are the claims that any given set of findings ought 
to  be  useful  because they  are  based  on  the  application  of  science.  In  our  view (and 
Runeson's too), what too frequently happens is that because certain procedures have been 
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followed, the truth or accuracy of a finding is thereby assumed to be guaranteed. However, 
in addition to this (and here we part company with Runeson), besides this rhetorical appeal 
to  science which simply ignores the methodological difficulties, we are  also sceptical of 
many other (more serious) claims to being scientific and have sought to show the basis of 
our scepticism.
For example, we have been accused of anecdotalism in using quotes from practitioners such 
as the ones used above. It has been demanded of us that we say how typical the response 
was; how many people said it, and so on.  However, our purpose was not to try to provide 
the evidence for such generalisation. Our prior concern was to be sure that we understood 
what we were seeing and that we could provide an adequate description of the phenomenon 
before  us  instead  of  counting  arbitrarily dissected  and  identified features  of  it.  As we 
commented above,  before counting different  kinds of  bird it  is important  to  be able to 
distinguish  ducks  from crows.  While  we  were  satisfied  that  we  understood  what  the 
respondents quoted above were referring to, by virtue of the context in which the reference 
was made, to  assign numerical scores to  what they were talking about  would have been 
arbitrary in the extreme.
The problem with attempting to make this kind of topic the basis of scientific study is that to 
do so sets up a dichotomy between everyday common sense  and the criteria of evidence, 
reason and logic acceptable to a scientific community. As we will now try to show, Weber's 
struggle with the notion of verstehen (the issue raised by Runeson) may be seen as an effort, 
ultimately unsuccessful, to resolve this difference. 
Weber and verstehen
The social world is self-evidently not random but regarding the regularities which it displays 
as a sufficient basis for a science is premature.  There are regularities which enable us to 
understand what is going on and predict what is likely to happen next. This is the conscious, 
mundane achievement of every ordinary member of society. Weber thought that it ought to 
be possible, by applying methods of systematic observation, reason and logic to  turn the 
everyday knowledge of  how social processes  work  into  a  science -  that  is,  in Weber's 
conception, a method of enquiry that will reveal the objective nature of the phenomenon 
under study, untainted by one's own subjective experience and values. 
Weber was conscious that to achieve this a major problem had first to be tackled. The social 
world is crucially different from the physical world in that the social world is composed of 
people acting out  their subjective experience in their everday lives. People act  with some 
consciousness of what they are doing and, if asked, are expected to be able to say what they 
are doing. In other words, it is assumed that the social world is composed of people acting 
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rationally and not randomly. Furthermore, in order to understand this essential feature of the 
social  world,  the  observer  must  call  on  his/her  own  experience;  the  capability  for 
understanding others lies in oneself.  The problem that follows from this is how to hold one's 
own experience in abeyance; to  use it but to  neutralize its effect on what is observed; to 
provide an objective account  of what  is 'out  there'  as  distinct  from what  one is merely 
subjectively perceiving. This, in a nutshell is how the problem of how it is possible to have a 
science of society is posed by Weber. It is  important to stress, in view of Runeson's critique, 
that  the  question  is unresolved.  However,  what  we  can  do  is inspect,  on  their  merits, 
attempts to study society on the basis of various kinds of working resolution. Broadly, there 
are, as stated above, two touchstones against which to evaluate these working resolutions: 
common sense and the specialist principles and methods of the social sciences.  We will 
consider each in turn (in reverse order).
First,  we will rehearse a central argument concerning what it takes to  construct  a social 
science. Second, with an appeal to  common sense, in the last part  of the paper we will 
inspect the question: what do we know about concrete structures which will enable us to 
build them more efficiently?
To construct a  social science we are not simply concerned with what people do. We are 
concerned with what their action means; what they intended by it or what they sought to 
achieve by doing it. Thus, somebody waving her arms above her head might be a signal of 
alarm, an attempt to attract attention, the expression of a greeting,  taking part in a Mexican 
wave.   To  understand  what  any such arm movement  means is  usually supplied to  the 
observer by the context. Somebody else notices the danger that is being signalled and runs 
for safety; somebody waves back, smiles are exchanged and so on and so on. Being familiar 
with such series of events, for the most part,  'what is going on' is 'obvious' it is common 
sense- we understand; wir verstehen.
Verstehen, then, in Weber's words (translated) is: 
'the subjective interpretation of a coherent course of conduct when and in so far as, 
according to our habitual modes of thought and feeling, its component parts taken in 
their mutual relation are recocognised to constitute a 'typical' complex of meaning.' 
(Weber 1966, p99)
He called this adequacy at the level of meaning. This is the first and indispensable step to 
understanding  the  workings  of  the  social  world.  However,  according  to  Weber,  the 
sociologist's concern is to go beyond mere understanding and to be able to establish causal 
connections in any series of events; that  not  only is one event expected to  follow from 
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another but that one event  necessarily does follow from another (causal adequacy). Thus, 
causal explanation: 
'depends on being able to  determine that there is a probability, which in the rare  
ideal case can be numerically stated, but is always in some sense calculable, that a 
given observable event (overt  or  subjective) will be followed or  accompanied by 
another event.' (loc cit)
Following Schutz (1967) we take it that the import of this distinction for Weber is that the 
aim to establish a causally adequate explanation is the special concern of the social scientist. 
But, of course, if the social scientist assures us that he can indeed show a causal or necessary 
connection between one event and another, then we may well be expected to sit up and take 
note. If I wish to achieve x and science can show that there is a strong probability that I 
should do y, this is knowledge worth having. However, Schutz invites us to inspect the basis 
of the social scientist's assurance on this matter.  
Weber tries to transmute subjective understanding which derives from a person's recognising 
on the basis of his own experience of typical series of occurrences (seeing someone waving 
her arms and someone else running to her rescue) into objective understanding. This is to be 
done by showing that there is a probability that this will happen on any particular occasion 
or with sufficient frequency for it to be inferred that there are necessary conncections in a 
series of events. Thus, causal adequacy has been established.
 
Schutz disputes the validity of this attempt  arguing that  the two  kinds of understanding 
(subjective and objective) are qualitatively and logically the same. The difference is that the 
former represents  the interpretation of one's own experience,  the latter  an interpretation 
using   'a  scientific  complex  of  knowledge',  that  is  an  inter-subjectively agreed  upon 
interpretation that satisfies the social science community. In other words, we establish the 
objectivity of  an  account  by comparing  our  subjective  impressions  with  the  subjective 
impressions of others.
'A sequence of events is causally adequate to the degree that experience teaches us 
it will probably happen again. The concept of causal adequacy relates therefore to  
that objective context of meaning which is social science itself.' (Schutz 1967 p231)
In both cases the generalization (this is the kind of thing going on here) is achieved through 
'a  synthesis  of  recognition'.  He  means  by this  that  Weber's   attempt  to  objectify the 
phenomenon fails since one  (as  social scientist)  is still  importing one's  own experience 
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(however carefully assembled it may be) of a typified series of events which exists  before 
whatever it is one is trying to explain.  
'He  [Weber]postulates  as  the  task  of  social  science  the  discovery of  intended  
meaning -indeed the intended meaning of the actor.  But  this 'intended meaning'  
turns out to be a meaning which is given to the observer and not to the actor' (ibid 
p234)
In summary then, the discovery and demonstration of causal patterns and regularities with 
regard to physical, non-social phenomena is patently achievable sufficient for the enormous 
impact that this knowledge has had on our everyday lives. Quite what is known and how it 
came to be known is for the various communities of physical and natural scientists to decide. 
If,  however,  causal patterns and regularities which constitute  the body of social science 
knowledge are those that are agreed by the community of social scientists, what status do 
they have relative to the causal patterns and regularities that the actors themselves recognise, 
in  terms  of  which  they  act  and  whose  action  constitutes  the  very  phenomena  to  be 
explained? 
Consider this example.  We all know of the interest there is in the connections between job 
satisfaction, motivation and performance and of the desire to find some causal patterns in 
them. Nystrom (1984),  in an extensive review of this literature,  discusses some so-called 
'unexpected results' of job redesign. It appears that employees in a number of studies had 
been more satisfied or less satisfied with the redesigned jobs than the theories on which the 
jobs had been redesigned had led the researchers to expect. He reports, for example, Billings 
et al's attempts to explain the findings of one of the studies where it was discovered that 
employees'  perception  of  job  characteristics  changed  prior  to  the  actual  technological 
conversion itself. 
"Billings  et  al  conjectured  that  employees  are  sensitized  by  researchers'  
questionnaires and rate  their jobs low in anticipation of job changes expected to  
follow the technological conversion."  (Nystrom 1984 p279)
Our question here is: why didn't they ask the employees? The answer is likely to be of the 
sort (we suggest): The employees themselves don't actually know; that there are underlying 
patterns or forces at work which can be discovered if individual cases are ignored and the 
aggregated  behaviours  studied,  these  to  be  accessed  by statistically valid,  standardized 
questionnaire  surveys.  That  is,  if  it  is  possible  to  establish  patterns  and  statistical 
probabilities, we don't actually need to know what individual motives are at work: That it is 
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possible, in short, to explain human conduct either without reference to or by transcending 
an individual's consciousness of it.    This view would not have satisfied Weber himself. A 
sine qua non of his attempts to formulate the grounds for a science of social action was the 
need to incorporate the actors' own understandings in the explanations of their action.
In light of the argument above we do not think he suceeded. Our view is that the 'scientific' 
procedures employed to  sift out  incidentals from fundamentals amount  to  no more than 
common sense practices, which we all do all the time in establishing the regularities and 
patterns in our everyday life.  What is offered as the result of these procedures can never be 
anything more than plausible. It cannot be scientific in the way claimed for the reason that it 
does  not  discover  patterns;  it  supplies them.  This  may be  acceptable  so  long  as  one 
recognises  what  is  being  done.  In  our  view,  however,  it  continually risks  preempting, 
denying or  ignoring the sense-making patterns  that  are  actually being used by actors  to 
constitute the phenomenon itself.
  
So What? What has all this got to do with building durable concrete structures? 
The RC study, discussed above, was designed to find out if adequate cover was achieved 
and, if not, why not. The simple methodological choice was: i) do we look for explanation in 
the way the process was constituted by the actors themselves, bringing to it their various 
understandings of the situation or, ii) do we cut through this to offer an account of what was 
‘really’ going on, that is, a causal explanation, our explanation which we would submit for 
judgement as true or false by other social scientists? 
The study was carried out on twenty-five construction projects in the UK  and is more fully 
reported  elsewhere  (Shammas-Toma,  1995,  Seymour  et  al  1996).  It  was  designed  to 
establish, first, how the cover achieved to reinforcement in a sample of concrete structures 
measured up with the specifications and, second, the reasons for the standards of cover that 
were  achieved.  It  was  found that  cover  did not  comply with the  tolerances given in a 
significant number of cases despite the fact that the twelve main contractors who undertook 
the projects were all highly reputable and all but two of them were quality assured to ISO 
9000. We believe that  how this finding can be explained  has important implications for both 
research and practice.
We use the study to consider the following questions:
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In what sense was it possible to establish a causal explanation for the finding that much of 
the cover was inadequate?
Why was it important not to look for causal explanations where they were not to be found?
Concrete Cover - The Study
The standard method of communicating design requirements to site is in terms of nominal 
cover and specified tolerances. It is expected that the tolerances will reflect the functional 
needs of the structure and be achievable in the circumstances in which it is built. However, 
(as was noted earlier) in construction the tolerances set are derived from standard codes of 
practice,  these  codes  having been prepared  on  the  assumption that  there  are  consistent 
patterns in the distribution of cover achieved. The reality, confirmed by this research, is that 
there are wide variations within and between sites even in identical structural members. This 
may, of course, be the result of poor workmanship and/or lack of supervision, however, the 
research  concluded  that  though  such  reasons  cannot  be  discounted,  more  fundamental 
factors  are  at  issue,  amongst  which  is  the  assumption  that  construction  produces 
standardized products in controlled conditions where the expectation of consistent patterns 
would be warranted. However, as Ballard (1994) points out, the vast bulk of construction is 
in the nature of prototype development where the consistency assumption is not warranted. 
As such, the processes involved are craft-like in nature in the sense of requiring  continuous 
response  and  adaptation  to  new  information,  and,  given this,  are  labour  intensive  and 
therefore not  amenable to  the fine-tuning, calibration and control,  characteristic of stable 
production systems.  
Thus, the design and detailing of concrete elements is standardly  carried out 'blind' with no 
reference to the organizational circumstances in which they are to be built, simply because 
these are  not  known.  Nonetheless,  current  contractual practice requires that  contractors 
comply with the specifications regardless of their appropriateness or buildability. There are 
two consequences. First, it encourages the contractor  into a 'detection mode'. That is, he 
attempts to ensure conformance by checking and remedial work. Second, there is no realistic 
reference point against which improvements can be made. Subcontractors for the different 
phases - steel-fixing, formwork and concreting -  recruited for the most part on price, are 
not  expected 'to  do it right first time' and there is little communication and coordination 
between them. A third consequence is that where, as sometimes happens, REs are prepared 
to  cooperate  with contractors'  staff and adjust  technical requirements appropriate  to  the 
conditions encountered, they risk running foul of the letter of the contract. Many, therefore, 
adopt  a  policy  of  requiring  strict  conformance  to  specifications,  regardless  of  their 
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appropriateness. However, it is to  be noted that where this was the policy, there was no 
marked superiority in the quality achieved and, besides, it was reported that it tended to sour 
the quality of relations between the contractor's and RE's staff  (Seymour et al, 1996).
Some Implications for Research and Practice
The data generated by the research, on which the above findings are based,  were of two 
kinds. First, the cover achieved and its immediate causes, such as missing spacers and rebar 
wrongly bent, were matters of physical measurement and direct observation.  However, all 
that  had occurred  before  the  technical processes which directly resulted in construction 
(fixing steel, placing concrete), but had had an impact on how the technical processes were 
carried  out  (eg  procurement  policy,  communication)  were  not  similarly  available  for 
observation and measurement.   The researcher was reliant on what he was told by those 
involved.  Not  surprisingly, many reasons were given for  the  resultant  quality and these 
varied  depending on  who  gave  them,  the  nature  of  their  involvement,  their  perceived 
contractual liabilities and so on. This was not a question, however, of who was or was not 
telling the truth. It was not possible to separate out the cumulative and interactive chains of 
events which had led to the measured results in any absolute way though, from any given 
point of view, it was possible to provide plausible versions of what had happened. 
Such events are constituted by situated, meaningful social action. In their nature they have to 
be understood in the terms of those who took part in them. The notion of 'cause'  simply 
does  not  apply  since  it  implies  underlying  forces  at  work  of  which  the  participants 
themselves were not aware and there is no way of empirically validating the existence of 
such supposed forces as we argued above with reference to Weber. However, this kind of 
causal explanation is regularly applied (eg the use of motive as an explanatory device and the 
example  from  Nystrom  given  above).  In  other  words,  some  intrinsic  dynamic  is 
conceptualized and hypothesised  as cause in the same way that, say, gravity is invoked to 
explain why objects fall. This way of explaining and thinking about  social processes has 
massive repercussions for the quality of both research and practice. 
Research:  Accounts and explanations of what happened and why it happened will always 
depend on why the questions are asked. It  is a matter  of situated practice. To ask what 
happened, regarding, for example, the construction of a faulty column, is a practical question 
for which we may legitimately look for a practical answer to satisfy the practical reasons for 
asking the question: e,g. what do we need to know in order to remedy defective work? who 
pays for remedial work - ie who, in a contractual sense, could be deemed to  be at fault? 
What do we need to do in order to prevent such a defect from occurring again? and so on. 
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Thus, though there may be selective versions of 'what happened' which satisfy engineering, 
contractual, legal or any other set of criteria which reflect why one wants to know, there is 
no way of providing an account which does not reflect a particular, situated standpoint. And 
note, that in satisfying any given criteria, such criteria are set and maintained by particular 
communities of specialists - engineering, legal and so on. 
Now, the warrant claimed by Runeson on behalf of the community of social scientists goes 
rather  further  than this.  They claim to  search for  underlying,  real or  scientifically valid 
causes.  This seems to  us  is a  mistake  in two  senses.  First,  it  is a  conceptual  mistake. 
Whatever  happened  in  a  particular  circumstance  was  a  socially achieved  event:  the 
phenomenon was constituted by the meanings that participants gave to it. Second, it is a 
mistake because it  represents  a  lost  opportunity.  Thus,  instead,  of trying to  answer the 
question: 'what really happened?' as though there were a single scientifically valid account to 
be  had,  a  useful  research  question  is:  how  are  different  perspectives  communicated, 
negotiated  and so  on  in the  process  or  the  production  of  the  event?  To  ask  the  latter 
question has supremely practical implications.
Research:  Thus,  we  find ourselves in agreement  with  a  number  of  commentators  (e.g 
Ballard and Koskela) on the need to think about the improvement of construction efficency 
in  terms  of  processes rather  than  products  (and,  besides,  expect  to  contribute  to  the 
exploration and clarification of this distinction). For the moment, we note that the concern 
with products endorses and compounds a version of the design/construction process which 
is simplistic and causal, i.e. input resources are acted upon within a system. Some agency 
causes them to be converted. Value is added and the product is exported from the system. 
Thinking about management in terms of this causal or conversion model has a number of 
consequences.  First,  it  ignores or  obscures  all that  goes  on between conversions where 
meaning and significance is communicated and negotiated between all the parties involved- 
what, in Lean Construction theory is referred to as 'flows' (Koskela 1992, Seymour 1994). 
Second,  it  encourages   equating   a  technical conversion  with  a  contractually-defined 
package of work and, therefore, prevents doing what is technically expedient for the sake of 
contractual considerations. The expectation of general patterns and generic causes impedes 
attention to the specifics of given situations. Thus, for example, this study concluded that it 
was precisely  contractual differentiation that  impeded attention to  the  specific needs of 
technical coordination  and  improvement.  Far  from there  being  causes  (aside  from the 
immediate technical causes), the concrete quality achieved was the result of failure to find 
ways of negotiating and resolving different perspectives and perceptions of causes.
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In summary, we see a choice. The social scientist can try to provide scientifically verifiable 
versions of social affairs - or, as it concerns us, what goes on in construction - expressed in 
terms of underlying, general causal patterns.  Alternatively, the social scientist  can try to 
achieve a closer,  more thorough understanding of the phenomena before him/her before 
attempting to theorise them. As to the former, we do not know of any that has succeeded. 
That  is, we  know of  no social theory about  construction that  is anything more than a 
plausible version; none that  comes close to  meeting the standards of rigour  set  out,  for 
example by (Kaufmann, 1958). Since it is a matter of choice, clearly, anybody it free to try 
to  provide theory about  construction  which meets  these  criteria.  We simply note  some 
practical  consequences.  We  have  illustrated  one  of  them with  reference  to  our  cover 
research.  We think that  the  approach we  adopted  revealed some important  features  of 
concrete design and construction that would have been obscured or distorted had we not 
done  so.  Our  contention  that  we  were  researching  versions  of  particular  instances  of 
concrete construction and could not reliably establish any single, generalised version, has, 
we  believe  important  practical  implications  for  the  design  and  production  of  concrete 
structures, raising the question - how can coordination in the process be more effectively 
achieved? We believe that this is more likely to the extent that it is recognised that we are 
concerned here with the communication of sense, meaning and significance. All this must be 
available for study and understanding. The imposition of a single version renders it invisible.
Conclusion
We have tried to  show that  in our  concern with the  difficulties of providing objective, 
scientifically valid versions of the regularities and patterns which so clearly exist in the social 
world, we do not conclude that we have nothing pertinent or useful to say about it and, in 
particular, the social world that we find in construction. Our central argument has been that 
all enquiry into  construction  activity would benefit  from looking more  carefully at  that 
activity, in an attempt to achieve a more rigorous understanding of it before committing to 
theories about it. 
We have acknowledged the powerful desire that all of us have to find meaning, regularities 
and patterns in the world we inhabit and the fact  that  we do  indeed find such patterns. 
However,  we  have  pointed  out  some  major  difficulties  of  achieving scientifically valid 
versions of them where they relate to socially organised activities. First, we noted that there 
are specialist discourses that make it possible to recast the constituents of the physical world 
in such a way as to explain the causal regularities, patterns and so on, which we normally 
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take for granted.  But  we also noted  that  the phenomena that  these specialist discourses 
provide accounts of, always retain their everyday ordinary significance. For the purpose of 
her enquiry the scientist, as it were, suspends or brackets off what she ordinarily know about 
them.  
With respect to social phenomena which, in their essence, exist in the everyday world this 
bracketing off of what one knows is that  much more difficult to  achieve. As we tried to 
demonstrate with reference to specification procedures, codified accounts derive their sense 
and meaning by having continual recourse to  the uninspected,  taken for granted,  situated 
knowledge that we share and communicate through the use of everyday natural language. 
Second, our discussion of Weber was intended to question the basis on which some versions 
of these regularities and patterns in the social world are given primacy over others as being 
more scientific. We concluded that we do not see in Weber an adequate basis for a social 
science that would merit this primacy. We argued, following Schutz’s critique, that Weber 
failed to make the case that social science can explain causality.  Rather, what passes as a 
valid explanation rests on the agreement amonst social scientists that it is valid. While this 
point  is accepted  by many commentators,  for  example Burrell and Morgan (1979),  this 
acceptance itself presents a question: how does the community of social scientists actually 
go about achieving this agreement? In posing this question, we find that there is in fact a 
good  deal  of  disagreement!  And  of  course  this  disagreement  is  precisely about  what 
constitutes science.  
Our  own response to  this is to  recognise the  intrinsic difficulties of doing science with 
respect  to  social phenomena  and therefore  not  to  claim to  do  it.  What  we try to  do, 
however,  is  to  report  as  faithfully and  accurately as  we  can  how  social processes  are 
accomplished and in doing this hope to contribute to a better understanding of processes we 
study in construction. 
In presenting the example of our RC construction research we have tried to demonstrate the 
nature  of this contribution.  Thus,  in answer to  the  two  questions we posed  above,  we 
consider it at the very least premature to offer causal explanations to account for the levels 
of cover achieved. To do so would have preempted the understanding which we believe we 
achieved and on the basis of which we are able to infer practical implications.
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